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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

PAUL ANTHONY ARMIJO

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20040965-CA

:

ARGUMENT
POINT I. VIOLATIONS OF THE "KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE" RULE
CONSTITUTE A FUNDAMENTAL VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT.
The United States Supreme Court held that the "common law 'knock and
announce' principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment." Wilson v. Arkansas. 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). This holding clarifies that
violations of the "knock and announce" rule constitute a fundamental violation of the
Fourth Amendment requiring suppression where factors do not make it reasonable, just as
with other types of Fourth Amendment violations.
In State v. Ribe, this Court "decline[d] to adopt a per se rule" that the "knock and
announce" statute requires suppression "in light of the Utah Supreme Court's dictates on
the subject... in the context of police violations of 'rule[s] of criminal procedure.'" 876
P.2d 403, 410 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, in Wilson, the U.S. Supreme court made

clear that a violation of the "knock and announce" rule is more than a violation of a rule
of criminal procedure but "a principle [that] is an element of the reasonableness inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment." Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934.
Therefore, the question no longer is whether a violation of the "knock and
announce" rule is fundamental just like other violations of the Fourth Amendment to
which there are exceptions but, instead, whether the circumstances surrounding a
violation of the "knock and announce" rule requires suppression under the totality of the
circumstances. See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003) (applying the totality of
the circumstances to determine whether exceptions to the knock and announce rule
justifies its violation); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (holding that trial
court must determine under the totality of the circumstances whether exceptions justified
officers "no knock" entry); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. at 936 (holding that "although a
search and seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers
enter without prior announcement," under the totality of the circumstances officers entry
may be reasonable under an exception to the rule); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855
(Utah 1992) (listing recognized exceptions justifying warrantless searches where
suppression not required).
In this case, the officers violated the "knock and announce" rule by forcing entry
into the residence without waiting a reasonable time, and absent exigent circumstances.
In doing so, they violated Mr. Armijo's fundamental right to be free from unreasonable
2

searches under the Fourth Amendment. This fundamental violation required the trial
court to grant Mr. Armijo's motion to suppress the evidence.
POINT II. THE STATE'S INEVITABLE DISCOVERY AND UTAH CODE
ANN. $ 77-23-212 ARGUMENTS DO NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL BECAUSE
THEY WERE NOT RAISED BELOW, ARE NOT APPARENT ON THE
RECORD AND ARE NOT SUSTAINABLE BY THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT.
The State argues (1) the officers would have inevitably discovered the drugs in Mr.
Armijo's possession "regardless of the number of seconds the officers waited on the
doorstep" and (2) suppression is not justified under Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-212.
Appellee. Br. at 26-28, 32. However, the State's alternative grounds for affirmance are
prohibited under State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 76 P.3d 1159, because they are not
apparent on the trial court record and not sustainable by the court's factual findings. Id. at
19.
First, the State seems to be arguing that had the officers followed the law, then the
drugs in Mr. Armijo's possession would have been discovered. However, the Supreme
Court has already rejected such a rationale by the state in Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at 1J19.
In Topanotes, the Supreme Court criticized the state for its "if we hadn't done it wrong,
we would have done it right" argument, as one that was "far from compelling." Id. The
court reasoned that there must be something supporting the "inevitable discovery 'to
prevent the inevitable discovery exception from swallowing the exclusionary rule.'" Id,
Next, the state argues that even though "section 77-23-212 was not argued in the district
3

court" it is an alternative ground on which this court can affirm. However, the state does
not offer any evidence that its theory "is sustainable on any legal ground or theory
apparent on the record." Id. at ^9.
If the inevitable discovery doctrine or alternative ground for affirmance theory was
not raised before or relied on by the trial court, an appellate court can still apply it to
affirm a trial court's decision to deny a defendant's motion to suppress. See id. at f9
(holding "appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on
any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory
differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action" (citations
omitted)). "However, not only must the alternative ground be apparent on the record, it
must also be sustainable by the factual findings of the trial court." Id "'[T]he court of
appeals must then determine whether the facts as found by the trial court are sufficient to
sustain the decision of the trial court on the alternate ground.'" Id. (citations omitted). In
Topanotes, the Supreme Court determined that
[There was no] authority for the proposition that the State, after having had
one opportunity to establish the admissibility of evidence in the face of a
Fourth Amendment challenge, is entitled to a remand to put on new
evidence under a new theory of admissibility. In fact, we have previously
held that when the State has the burden of proof and the record on appeal
fails to sustain any theory of admissibility, the State "is not entitled to a
remand to put on new evidence."
Id at f 11 (citations omitted)
The inevitable discovery doctrine "enables courts to look to the facts and
4

circumstances surrounding the discovery of the tainted evidence and asks whether the
police would have discovered the evidence despite the illegality."1 Id. at ^[14. However,
it only applies '"[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.5"
Id (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)) (other citation omitted). "A
crucial element of inevitable discovery is independence; there must be some 'independent
basis for discovery,9 fUnited States v. Boatwright 822 F.2d 862, 865 (9th Cir. 1987)], and
'the investigation that inevitably would have led to the evidence [must] be independent of
the constitutional violation, [United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 984,987 (10th Cir.
1997)]/" Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at ^[16 (second alteration in original). "Thus, 'the fact
or likelihood that makes the discovery inevitable [must] arise from circumstances other
than those disclosed by the illegal search itself.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Boatwright, 822 F.2d at 864-65).
In this case, the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress should not be
affirmed under the inevitable discovery doctrine or under the state's section 77-23-212
theory. The State did not argue either of these theories below and the trial court did not
rely on either of them in its ruling. R. 121; 202; 203. Accordingly, the inevitable
1

The "independent source doctrine describes one method of satisfying the inevitable
discovery exception, which is to demonstrate that the same evidence uncovered by illegal
police activity would have been obtained by an entirely independent, prior investigation."
State v.James, 2000 UT 80, Tfl5,13 P.3d 576.
5

discovery doctrine and the state's section 77-23-212 argument are only available as an
alternative grounds of affirmance and must be sustainable by the factual findings of the
trial court. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at ^[9. However, in its ruling, the trial court made
no findings that had the officers waited a reasonable time the drugs in Mr. Armijo's
possession would have inevitably been discovered or that despite the officer's unlawful
search it still cannot be suppressed because under section 77-23-212 the unlawful conduct
was not substantial. R. 121-123.
Because the state failed to present evidence under either of these two theories, they
are not alternative grounds for affirmance supported or sustained by the record or factual
findings. Accordingly, this Court should reverse because the evidence should have been
suppressed. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at ^[11 (holding State's failure to meet
preponderance of evidence requirement of inevitable discovery doctrine required reversal
because when "State has the burden of proof and the record on appeal fails to sustain any
theory of admissibility, the State 'is not entitled to a remand to put on new evidence'").
CONCLUSION
As set forth more fully in Appellant's opening brief, Mr. Armijo respectfully
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, and reverse
his conviction.
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